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lthough 1997 was a legislative year only a few changes wereAmade in the text of the Texas Uniform Commercial Code.' In
the litigation arena, cases involving the sale of goods accounted
for almost one-half of the decisions reported during the Survey period.2
The legislative changes and reported cases discussed in this Article follow




Section 1.203 of the Code provides that every contract governed by the
Code includes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforce-
ment.3 In Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Conoco, Inc. ,4 the defendant en-
tered into a twenty year contract to sell natural gas from wells identified
in the contract. The critical language in the contract provided that the
defendant was to deliver gas "in keeping with all the quantity and other
provisions of [the defendant's] various gas purchase contracts in effect
* Professor of Law and Foundation Professor of Commercial Law, Texas Tech Uni-
versity. B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; LL.M. Harvard University.
1. The Uniform Commercial Code is contained in the first eleven chapters of the
Texas Business and Commerce Code. Those eleven chapters comprise the first three
volumes of the four volume Business and Commerce Code. The Uniform Commercial
Code was originally adopted in Texas during the 1965 legislative session with an effective
date of July 1, 1966. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 59th Leg., R.S., ch. 721, §§ 1-101
to 10-105, 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 1-316. In 1967 it was reenacted as part of the new Texas
Business and Commerce Code, the first of the Texas Codes to be promulgated under the
Texas Codification Act. See Act of May 25, 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 785, §§ 1-6, 1967 Tex.
Gen. Laws 2343-2782. In this Article all references are to the Uniform Commercial Code
as enacted in chapters 1 through 11 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code. TEx. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.101-11.108 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994 & Supp 1998) [hereinafter
the Code].
2. A Survey period generally covers cases and legislation reported from October of
one year through September of the following year. Because of differences in timing for the
release of opinions for publication, motions for rehearing, and the like, a case may be
included that was reported shortly before or shortly after those dates, but most of the cases
and legislation discussed are within that time frame. Because of the slightly "fuzzy" nature
of this time frame, and because of differences of opinion about the category into which a
particular case might fall, there can be legitimate disputes about the classification of cases.
However, it appears that, of some forty-odd cases reported during the Survey period,
eighteen involved sale of goods issues as an important part of the decision.
3. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.203 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994).
4. 939 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996), affd in part, rev'd in part (Tex. Apr.
14, 1998) (opinion not yet available as of date of publication).
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from time to time."'5 When the natural gas industry was deregulated, the
purchase and resale of gas became unprofitable and the defendant even-
tually cancelled and bought out all of its contracts with producers. 6 The
net effect of these cancellations was that the defendant no longer had any
gas to sell to the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued, alleging that the contract
required the defendant to continue purchasing and delivering all gas pro-
duced from the wells identified in the contract. 7 The trial court agreed
and instructed the jury that it should find that a breach occurred if the
defendant failed to purchase and deliver all gas from the identified wells. 8
The appellate court disagreed with this interpretation of the contract,
ruling instead that the critical contract clause only required the defendant
to deliver any gas the defendant actually purchased under its existing con-
tracts with producers; the defendant was not required, however, to keep
all of its producer contracts in force for the twenty year term of its con-
tract with the plaintiff but was entitled to cancel the producer contracts as
circumstances might require.9 While this interpretation permitted the de-
fendant to cancel its producer contracts, the court further held that this
was not an unfettered right to cancel, but one that was subject to the
obligation of good faith imposed by the Code. 10 Any decreases in deliv-
ery were limited to decreases caused by a good faith cancellation of the
defendant's producer contracts. The case was remanded for a new trial to
determine if the cancellation of all of the producer contracts was done in
good faith.1 '
B. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
The common law traditionally recognized an effective accord and satis-
faction between a debtor and a creditor if the debtor clearly informed the
creditor that a payment was being tendered as full payment of an unliqui-
dated or disputed debt.12 Under the 1962 Official Text of the Uniform
Commercial Code that was adopted in Texas in 1965, section 1.207 could
be read to allow a creditor who received a check marked "Payment in
Full" to avoid an accord and satisfaction by noting "Under Protest," "All
5. Id. at 678.
6. See id. at 678.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 680.
10. See id. at 681.
11. See id. In reaching this conclusion, the court cited Lenape Resources Corp. v.
Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 925 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. 1996), a 5-4 decision, for the proposition
that good faith limited the defendant's ability to cancel its producer contracts. As noted in
last year's Survey, Lenape was a close decision. See John Krahmer, Commercial Transac-
tions, 50 SMU L. REV. 1025, 1030-31 (1997). The grant of a writ in Northern Natural Gas
may indicate that the Court has more to say on the issue of good faith in gas production
contracts.
12. See generally Joseph Gold, Accord and Satisfaction by Estoppel, 27 IOWA L. REV.
31 (1941-42) (discussing and citing common law rules on accord and satisfaction).
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Rights Reserved" or the like on the check before cashing it.13 While this
reading was accepted by the courts in some jurisdictions, it was rejected
by others on the ground that section 1.207 did not expressly change the
common law rule.14 This split among jurisdictions was reflected by a split
among the Texas courts.15 In response to this uncertainty, the Official
Text of section 1.207 was revised to state that the section does not apply
to an accord and satisfaction and a new section 3.311 was added to the
Chapter on Negotiable Instruments to explicitly govern the use of an in-
strument for an accord and satisfaction.1 6
In Smith-Hamm, Inc. v. Equipment Connection,17 an equipment lessee
attempted to settle the lessor's claim for rent and for damages resulting
from the theft of some of the equipment by tendering a check marked
"Payment in Full on Account." The lessor marked out this language and
deposited the check in its account. Six months later the lessor demanded
payment from the lessee for unpaid rental charges and for physical dam-
age to other equipment that had not been stolen. When payment was not
forthcoming, the lessor sued and the jury returned a verdict in favor of
the lessor.' 8 The lessee appealed, contending that the trial court erred in
not instructing the jury on issues of accord and satisfaction and waiver. 19
Citing the line of Texas cases holding that the pre-Code law of accord and
satisfaction survived enactment of the Code, the court of appeals ruled
there was some evidence of accord and satisfaction and waiver and that
instructions on these issues should have been given to the jury. 20 The
case was remanded for a new trial. 21
Because the facts of the case arose before the revision of sections 1.207
and 3.311, the court did not concern itself with the effect of the revisions
13. The first version of § 1.207 was identical to the 1962 Official Text of the Code. See
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 59th Leg., R.S., ch. 721, § 1.207, 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 1-
316, amended by Act of May 28, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 921, § 3, 1995 Tex. Gen. Law
4626.
14. Compare Horn Waterproofing Corp. v. Bushwick Iron & Steel Co., 66 N.Y.2d 321,
488 N.E.2d 56 (1985) (creditor could sue for disputed amount after endorsing a "full pay-
ment" check with the words "under protest") with Cass Constr. Co. v. Brennan, 222 Neb.
69, 382 N.W.2d 313 (1986) (cashing a "full payment" check under protest did not preserve
right of creditor to later sue for disputed amount).
15. Compare Hixson v. Cox, 633 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(pre-Code law continues to apply in cases of payment by check for services rendered; ques-
tion left open whether rule for payment by check for goods changed by Code) with Robin-
son v. Garcia, 804 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi), writ denied per curiam, 817
S.W.2d 59 (Tex. 1991) (no accord and satisfaction occurred when check cashed in full pay-
ment of disputed claim after payees endorsed check with language indicating that rights
were being reserved on disputed claim). In its per curiam denial of a writ of error, the
Texas Supreme Court noted that it neither approved nor disapproved of the resolution of
the accord and satisfaction issue. See Garcia, 817 S.W.2d at 59.
16. The revisions of § 1.207 and Chapter 3 on Negotiable Instruments were approved
during the 1995 legislative session and are now codified as TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§§ 1.207, 3.311 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
17. 946 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, n.w.h.).
18. See id. at 460.
19. See id. at 462.
20. See id. at 463.
21. See id. at 464.
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but the facts point out one of the significant aspects of the revised Code.
As revised, the result in Smith-Hamm would be reversed. The new sec-
tion 3.311 would require the lessor to repay the amount of the check to
the lessee within ninety days after it was paid or an action for any dis-
puted amount would be barred. 22 Since the lessor did not demand pay-
ment until six months after the check was paid (and, of course, never
tendered repayment) the claim would be barred under the revised Code.
Furthermore, section 3.311 now also provides that a claim is discharged if
the claimant knows that an instrument is being tendered in full satisfac-
tion of a claim.23 Striking out the language "Payment in Full on Ac-
count" is very strong, if not conclusive evidence, that the lessor knew the
check tendered by the lessee was being tendered in full satisfaction of the
lessor's claim.
II. SALES OF GOODS
A. DIGITAL SIGNATURES
One of the few amendments to the Code passed during the 1997 legis-
lative session was the addition of section 2.108 providing for the use of
digital signatures as an effective validating device in contracts for the sale
of goods.24 Under this new provision, the statute of frauds contained in
section 2.201 of the Code will be satisfied by a digital signature sent as
part of "a written electronic communication." While this provision has
the merit of recognizing new forms of communication, it also raises some
interpretive questions. One could argue that transmission of electronic
data over phone lines or fiber optic cable is never "written" as the term is
used in the normal sense and that even the conversion of an electronic
communication by means of a fax machine or a computer printer does
not make the signature one "sent" by means of a "written" electronic
communication. The situation becomes even more uncertain if the trans-
mission is by e-mail and viewed only on a monitor. Are the bytes in the
computer memory or stored on a computer disk a "written"
communication?
A more pervasive issue lies beyond these questions. Why was the new
section 2.108 limited to transactions under Chapter 2? Chapter 2A gov-
erning leases of goods contains an almost identical statute of frauds provi-
sion as that found in Chapter 2.25 One would think that digital signatures
would be as useful in lease transactions as in sales transactions, but the
section appears to be self-limiting. It is possible that parties attempting to
form a contract not covered by Chapter 2 might be able to bootstrap their
22. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.311(b)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
23. See id. § 3.311(d).
24. See id. § 2.108. This section provides, in pertinent part that, "A written electronic
communication sent from within or received in this state in connection with a transaction
governed by this chapter is considered signed if a digital signature is transmitted with the
communication."
25. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2A.201 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994).
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agreement into meeting the statute of frauds requirements contained in
other chapters of the Code by including an appropriate clause in their
electronic communication, but the efficacy of such an approach remains
to be seen.26 With the growth of electronic commerce on the internet,
litigation on this issue is probably not far in the future.
B. WARRANTIES
Virtually all of the litigation reported under Chapter 2 during the Sur-
vey period involved one or more of the warranty provisions of the
Code.27 In Bonneau Co. v. AG Industries, Inc.,28 a buyer provided the
seller with a design for a retail display rack to be manufactured by the
seller and used by the buyer in stores for the promotion of the buyer's
line of optical products. After the buyer was sued for patent infringe-
ment by another company that claimed a prior right in the rack design,
the buyer sued the seller for breach of the implied warranty against in-
fringement. The court held, however, that the seller was not liable for
breach of warranty because the buyer had furnished specifications for the
design to the seller and, under the Code, this had the effect of an agree-
ment to hold the seller harmless against any claim arising out of compli-
ance with the buyer's specifications. 29 The court further held that the
parties had not "otherwise agreed" that the seller would be liable for
breach of warranty under the provisions of the Code permitting the par-
ties to vary the warranty against infringement.
30
There seems to be something of a pile-up of automobile warranty liti-
gation on the road to the Texas Supreme Court. An important issue in
Miles v. Ford Motor Co.,31 was whether a warranty of fitness for a partic-
ular purpose was breached when the passengers in an automobile were
injured in an accident because of an allegedly defective seat belt design.
The court held that carrying passengers is an ordinary use of a vehicle and
would not constitute a particular purpose for warranty purposes. In Sipes
v. General Motors Corp.,32 the court reached a similar conclusion in re-
gard to an airbag safety system. Unlike the situation in Miles, however,
26. Some suggested clauses for such bootstrapping appear in 1 JOHN KRAHMER,
VERNON'S TEXAS CODE FoRMs ANNOTATED § 2.201-FORM 10 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp.
1997).
27. The warranty provisions of the Code include: TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN.
§ 2.312 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994) (implied warranty of title and against infringement);
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.313 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994) (creation of express
warranties); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994) (implied
warranty of merchantability) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 2.315 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994) (implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose).
28. 116 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 1997).
29. See id. at 158.
30. See id. (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.312(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994)
(permitting the parties to a contract of sale to exclude or modify the warranty against
infringement).
31. 922 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 41 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 562, 1998 WL 124567 (1998) (reversed on other grounds).
32. 946 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, n.w.h.).
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the plaintiffs in Sipes successfully raised fact issues on allegations of
breach of an express warranty and breach of the warranty of
merchantability. In Rodriguez v. Hyundai Motor Co., 3 3 the plaintiff al-
leged defects in the roof design and restraint system that resulted in inju-
ries to her when the vehicle in which she was riding as a passenger rolled
over during an accident. The court denied a claim based on breach of a
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose but approved a claim based
on breach of a warranty of merchantability. Taken together, these three
cases provide the Supreme Court an opportunity to define the require-
ments needed to establish a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose 34
as well as an opportunity to further elucidate the proof needed to show
breach of a warranty of merchantability. In a non-automotive context,
the court in ASAI v. Vanco Insulation Abatement, Inc.,35 reached a similar
conclusion with respect to the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
where the buyer of a used industrial vacuum cleaner intended to use it to
pick up pieces of asbestos removed from buildings in the course of the
buyer's asbestos removal business.36 The court held that use of the
machine to pick up asbestos was no different from use of the machine to
pick up other types of heavy debris and that the seller itself had so used
the machine in its own business. Since the alleged particular purpose did
not differ from the ordinary purpose for which the machine was used, the
buyer should have sued for breach of the warranty of merchantability
instead.
In many instances, the facts giving rise to a warranty claim may also be
the basis for a cause of action for Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA)
liability, negligence, or strict liability in tort.37 In Purina Mills, Inc. v.
Odell,38 a herd of dairy cattle was injured by the ingestion of metal parti-
cles. Testimony by the plaintiff's expert witnesses identified cattle feed
sold by Purina Mills as the source of the particles. Testimony by the de-
fendant's experts showed that the feed might have become contaminated
after manufacture and sale or that the metal particles might have come
from other food sources at the plaintiff's farm. A jury found in favor of
33. 944 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, writ granted).
34. Although the requirements for a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose seem
to be rather clearly stated in the Code, the case of Lester v. Logan, 893 S.W.2d 570 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1994), writ denied per curiam, 907 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1995), has cast
some doubt on how "particular" the purpose of the buyer must be. In Lester the court of
appeals held that feeding hay to cattle was a particular purpose, but this conclusion was not
satisfactorily explained. See 893 S.W.2d at 574-75.
35. 932 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, no writ).
36. See id. at 122.
37. See, e.g., Plas-Tex, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. 1989) (discussing
implied warranty of merchantability and DTPA); North Star Dodge Sales, Inc. v. Luna, 667
S.W.2d 115 (Tex. 1984) (breach of express warranty, unconscionability, and DTPA viola-
tions); Crosbyton Seed Co. v. Mechura Farms, 875 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1994, no writ) (breach of express and implied warranties, breach of contract, strict liability,
negligence, and DTPA misrepresentations). Breach of an express or implied warranty is
made a DTPA cause of action by TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(2) (Vernon
Supp. 1998).
38. 948 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, writ denied).
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the plaintiff on theories of breach of warranty, products liability, DTPA
violations, and negligence. On appeal, the court held that the evidence
was insufficient to support the verdict on the ground that the plaintiff did
not establish that the plaintiff's experts used an appropriate and reliable
scientific method to detect the source of the contamination.39 The case
was remanded for a new trial.40
The line between Code warranties and common-law warranties is
sometimes uncertain. In Ayala v. Bartolome,41 a restaurant patron ate
two dozen raw oysters at a seafood restaurant and died a few days later
from septicemia caused by a bacteria sometimes found in raw oysters.
The decedent's family sued on theories of negligence, strict liability, and
breach of an implied warranty that the oysters were fit for human con-
sumption.42 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
restaurant on all theories but, on appeal, the judgment was reversed on
the ground that there was evidence sufficient to raise a fact issue on all of
the plaintiff's theories.43 Oddly enough, in regard to the warranty of fit-
ness for human consumption, the court cited pre-Code Texas caselaw
holding that such a warranty exists as a matter of public policy.44 The
court neither cited nor explained its failure to cite the warranty of
merchantability provision of the Code which directly states, "Under this
section the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on
the premises or elsewhere is a sale."' 45 There was a similar failure to cite
this same provision in Cain v. Pruett,46 where two restaurant patrons suf-
fered injuries after consuming soft drinks that contained fragments of
broken glass. Although the court alluded to a breach of warranty as the
underlying basis of the patrons' DTPA claims, it did not indicate whether
the warranty arose under the Code or as a pre-Code common law
warranty.
Among the warranties of merchantability implied by the Code in the
sale of goods is a warranty that the goods are adequately contained or
packaged. 47 In Oser v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,48 a store employee placed a
one-gallon glass jar of apple juice in a plastic bag at the check-out
counter. On the way out of the store, the bag broke and the plaintiff was
injured when she slipped in the juice and fell on the glass. In an action
based on theories of negligence and strict liability, the court held there
was sufficient evidence to raise a fact question on both theories and sum-
39. See id. at 933-35.
40. See id. at 941.
41. 940 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1997, no writ).
42. See id. at 729.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 732-33.
45. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314(a) (Vernon 1994). The court cited Griggs
Canning Co. v. Josey, 164 S.W.2d 835, 840 (Tex. 1942), and Jacob E. Decker & Sons v.
Capps, 164 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. 1942), in support of this warranty.
46. 938 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, no writ).
47. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314(b)(5) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994).
48. 951 F.Supp. 115 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
1998]
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mary judgment in favor of the store was denied.49 There is no mention in
the opinion of the Code warranty requiring that goods be adequately con-
tained or packaged or that the bag itself be fit for ordinary purposes.50
Express warranties and common law implied warranties also overlap
the DTPA. In K.C. Roofing Co. v. Abundis,51 in a written contract for
roof repair, a contractor agreed that "the entire roof will be warranted
against leaks for two years."'52 Three years and numerous roof leaks later
(some of them in areas that did not leak before the work was done), the
homeowners sued the contractor under the DTPA. The court held that
the contractor had violated the DTPA by representing that the repair
work would prevent leaks for two years when, in fact, the leaks were
worse after the work was done than before it began. By continuing to bill
the homeowners for the work even though the contractor confirmed that
the job had been done improperly, the contractor acted "knowingly" to
support an award of treble damages under the DTPA.53
Under section 2.316 of the Code, the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose are not applicable to
the furnishing of human blood, blood plasma or other human tissue.54
Further, such items are not considered commodities subject to sale or
barter, but are treated as medical services instead.55 In Drury v. Baptist
Memorial Hospital System, 56 a hospital administered a unit of blood from
a blood bank instead of using a unit previously donated for that purpose
for use by the patient herself. The plaintiff sued for negligence and breach
of implied warranty, alleging that she had suffered mental anguish dam-
ages arising from her fear of contracting HIV. The court held that sum-
mary judgment was properly granted against the plaintiff on the
negligence claim because her fear was unreasonable when it was conclu-
sively shown that the banked blood could not have caused any exposure
to the virus. As to the warranty claim, the plaintiff attempted to avoid the
limitation on implied warranty under the Code by alleging breach of the
warranty of good workmanship created by Melody Home Manufacturing
Co. v. Barnes,57 as the basis for a DTPA claim. The court rejected this
claim on two grounds. First, the Melody Home warranty had never been
imposed in the context of professional services involving the exercise of
professional judgment.58 Second, even if the warranty was recognized, the
plaintiff failed to tender any evidence showing that the hospital failed to
49. See id. at 118-21.
50. To the extent that the store selected the bag as one fit for the purpose of carrying a
one-gallon glass jar of juice, this might even be a case that would meet the more stringent
requirements of the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
51. 940 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, writ denied).
52. Id. at 376.
53. See id. at 377.
54. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.316(e) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994).
55. See id.
56. 933 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
57. 741 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. 1987) (implied warranty that services have been per-
formed in a good and workmanlike manner).
58. See Drury, 933 S.W.2d at 677.
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provide services in a good and workmanlike manner.59 The only evidence
on this issue was submitted by the hospital and showed that it had acted
in a manner consistent with good medical practice. Summary judgment in
favor of the defendant was affirmed.60
Although Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. v. McCoy61 did not involve sub-
stantive issues of breach of warranty, negligence, or DTPA liability, it did
concern an important determination regarding the forum in which such
claims must be heard. In Palm Harbor the purchasers of a mobile home
sued the dealer and manufacturer for alleged defects in the goods. Be-
cause the contract contained a clause requiring all claims or controversies
relating to the mobile home to be submitted to arbitration, the defend-
ants moved to compel arbitration. After denial of this motion by the trial
court, the defendants sought a writ of mandamus directing the trial judge
to order arbitration. The court of appeals held that the transaction was
one "involving commerce" under the terms of the Federal Arbitration
Act.62 The court further held that, since the transaction fell within the
terms of that act, the Texas requirement that a consumer's attorney sign
an agreement providing for arbitration in transactions involving less than
fifty thousand dollars was preempted. 63 The court rejected an argument
that the purchasers were fraudulently induced to enter into the contract
because the seller did not disclose the effect of the arbitration clause. 64
The trial court was instructed to issue an order compelling arbitration. 65
C. NoTiCE OF BREACH
Pursuit of a breach of warranty claim under the Code requires that an
aggrieved buyer give notice of the breach within a reasonable time after
the breach has or should have been discovered.66 There is no special for-
mality required for the notice; it "need merely be sufficient to let the
seller know that the transaction is still troublesome and must be
watched. ' 67 In Lochinvar Corp. v. Meyers,68 the court held that notice of
breach given to a distributor approximately one year after installation of
a furnace boiler constituted some evidence of timely notice and could not
be ruled untimely as a matter of law, particularly when the installer had
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. 944 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, no writ).
62. Id. at 721. The relevant portion of the Federal Arbitration Act appears at 9 U.S.C.
§§ 1-2 (1994).
63. See Palm Harbor Homes, 944 S.W.2d at 721. At the time of this decision, the
requirement that a consumer's attorney sign a contract containing an arbitration clause
appeared in TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.001(b) (Vernon 1997). As revised
during the 1997 legislative session, the relevant provision now appears as TEX. Civ. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 171.002(b) (Vernon Supp. 1998). See Act of April 17, 1997, 75th
Leg., R.S., ch. 165, § 5.01, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 329.
64. See Palm Harbor Homes, 944 S.W.2d at 722-23.
65. See id.
66. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.607(c)(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994).
67. Id. § 2.607 cmt. 4.
68. 930 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, no writ).
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been informed of the problems six months earlier and the installer had
contacted the distributor at that time.69
D. REJECTION OF GOODS
Under the Code, the failure of a buyer to reject goods within a reason-
able time after they are tendered constitutes acceptance. 70 Once ac-
cepted, the buyer must pay for the goods at the contract rate, subject to
any damages for breach of warranty or the like that the buyer may have
suffered. 71 In Glenn Thurman, Inc. v. Moore Construction, Inc.,72 the
court recognized that these provisions of the Code displace the common
law of contracts which may excuse the performance of an aggrieved party
if the other party has failed to perform its own obligations under the con-
tract. 73 The court held that, under the Code, the doctrine of excused per-
formance does not apply and that the burden of pleading and proving
rejection of goods is on the buyer. Because the trial court had errone-
ously submitted a jury question on excused performance and the buyer
had neither pled nor proven rejection of the goods, judgment in favor of
the buyer was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial.74
E. ALPHABET CONTRACTS
In addition to its legal significance, Chapter 2 of the Code can be a
useful source for crossword puzzle terms. For example, "Term used for
delivery of goods at a named place of shipment or destination; '75 or,
"Term used to indicate that the price of goods includes cost of shipment
to a named destination, are provided in the chapter. ' 76 This latter term
was applied by the court in the in rem action, The Cargo Vessel Nazli
Poyraz,77 to determine that the title to goods shipped under a cost and
freight (C&F) term in a letter of credit passed to the buyer when the
goods were loaded on board the vessel. Because title passed at that time,
the buyer was a real party in interest who could maintain an action
against the vessel to recover for expenses incurred by the buyer to clean
fuel oil stains from the goods that were caused by leakage in the vessel
during shipment. The court noted that, under the Code, a C&F term cre-
ates a shipment contract under which the risk of loss passes to the buyer
if the seller has fulfilled its responsibilities to put the goods into the hands
of a carrier under an appropriate contract. 78
69. See id. at 190.
70. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.606 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994).
71. See id. § 2.607(a) & (b).
72. 942 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1997, no writ).
73. See id. at 772.
74. See id. at 773.
75. Answer: F.O.B. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.319 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1994).
76. Answer: C. & F. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.320 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1994).
77. 945 F.Supp. 140 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
78. See Nazli Poyraz, 945 F.Supp. at 143.
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F. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Section 2.725 of the Code provides a four year limitations period for
breach of warranty actions unless the warranty explicitly extends to fu-
ture performance.79 Chapter 2 of the Code, however, only applies to con-
tracts for the sale of goods. 80 In Harrison County Finance Corp. v.
KPMG Peat Marwick, L.L.P.81 the court reached the inexplicable conclu-
sion that this section applied to an express warranty that accounting serv-
ices would be performed at "the highest level of professional
performance" 82 and that the limitations period had run on the warranty
claim. There was no indication that any sale of goods was involved in the
transaction. On associated negligence and DTPA claims, the court held
that the two year limitations period for negligence and DTPA actions did
not begin to run until the plaintiff knew or should have known of the
negligent act and the resulting injury.8 3 Because the defendant did not
show when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the negligent act
or the DTPA misrepresentations, summary judgment in favor of the de-
fendant was reversed and the case remanded for trial on the negligence
and DTPA claims.84
III. LEASES OF GOODS
LaBella v. Charlie Thomas, Inc.,85 could be regarded either as a classic
example of the legal reasoning process or as an objectionable example of
judicial activism, depending on one's point of view. In LaBella, the lessee
of an automobile had problems with it some eighteen months after the
beginning of the lease term. He took the car back to the lessor's place of
business where mechanics disassembled the engine to determine if the
repairs were covered by the limited warranty contained in the lease. Af-
ter disassembly, the lessor denied coverage under the warranty, but the
lessee refused to pay some $500 in cash for the "tear down" work. At this
point the lessor put the parts in the trunk, threw the lessee's credit card at
him and pushed him out the door. The lessee eventually paid cash to
regain possession of the car and had it repaired elsewhere. The lessee
then filed suit for breach of warranty, negligence, DTPA violations, and
assault.
As the beginning point for its analysis, the court noted that, while
Texas courts have consistently refused to apply the warranty provisions of
Chapter 2 on Sales to lease transactions, Chapter 2A now covers Leases
of personal property.86 This case arose, however, before the effective
date of Chapter 2A so the implied warranties in Chapter 2A were not
79. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725(a), (b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994).
80. See id. § 2.102.
81. 948 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, pet granted).
82. Id. at 947.
83. See id. at 946.
84. See id. at 948.
85. 942 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, writ denied).
86. See id. at 131.
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applicable. Instead of simply disposing of the case on the ground that
neither Chapter 2 nor Chapter 2A applied, the court took a different tack
and ruled that the transaction "would be governed by common law war-
ranties of merchantability. '87 With this bit of judicial sleight of hand, the
court steered a course that remained within existing precedent but still
provided a basis for the implication of warranties in an egregious fact
situation. Having determined that a common law implied warranty of
merchantability existed, the court went on to hold that an attempted dis-
claimer by the lessor and the manufacturer that might have been conspic-
uous and effective as a matter of law in sales cases under Chapter 2,
should be treated as a question of fact in this case because it involved a
lease and the terms of the disclaimer made reference to a sale.88 The case
was remanded for trial on the warranty claim and on the claims for DTPA
violations, negligence, and assault.89
IV. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS AND BANK DEPOSITS
AND COLLECTIONS
A. IMPACT OF REVISED CHAPTERS 3 AND 4
The comprehensive revisions of Chapters 3 and 4 of the Code during
the 1995 legislative session that became effective on January 1, 1996, have
placed the Texas courts in a transitional phase on the subjects of negotia-
ble instruments and bank deposits and collections. 90 The effect of this
transition can be seen in three cases reported during the Survey period.
In Texas Stadium Corp. v. Savings of America,91 the court addressed
the question of whether warranties made upon the presentment of a
check run not only to the payor bank, but also to the drawer of the
check. 92 The court observed that, under the prior version of the Code,
there was a split of authority among the states on this issue, but there was
no Texas authority on point. 93 Given this dearth of authority, the court
looked to the revised Chapter 3 as an aid to interpretation and noted that
the revision specifically rejects the idea that warranties on presentment
87. Id.
88. As stated by the court, the question was "whether the disclaimers provided by
appellees, which clearly refer to the sale of a vehicle, were sufficient to provide appellant,
as lessee, with the required notice of the disclaimer of all implied warranties." LaBella,
942 S.W.2d at 134 (emphasis in original).
89. Id. at 138.
90. Chapter 3, formerly titled "Commercial Paper," was replaced by a new Chapter 3
entitled "Negotiable Instruments." See Act of May 28, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 921, §§ 1-
2, 1995 Tex. Gen Laws 4582, 4626. Chapter 4 retained the title of "Bank Deposits and
Collections" but was extensively revised by the same Act. See Act of May 28, 1995, 74th
Leg., R.S., ch. 921, § 4, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 4226, 4642.
91. 933 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, writ denied).
92. Presentment warranties arise under both Chapters 3 and 4 of the Code. These
warranties are identical in substance and are separately stated only because of the different
contexts in which they may arise. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.417 (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1994 & Supp. 1998) and TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.208 (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1994 & Supp. 1998).
93. See Texas Stadium, 933 S.W.2d at 621.
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run to the drawer as well as to the payor bank.94 Because the old Code
was unclear on this issue, and because the revised Code specifically re-
jects the line of cases allowing a drawer to sue for breach of presentment
warranties, the court held that it would adopt the same rule as that es-
poused in the revised Code and deny the drawer the right to sue for
breach of presentment warranties. 95
In Miller-Rogaska, Inc. v. Bank One, Texas,96 the named payee on a
check who had never obtained possession of the instrument sued the de-
positary bank and the payor bank for conversion of the instrument when
it was paid over an unauthorized indorsement to someone other than the
payee. The court held that a named payee who does not obtain either
actual or constructive possession of a check cannot qualify as a holder of
the check. 97 Under its reading of cases decided under the earlier version
of the Code, the court ruled that only a holder could maintain an action
for conversion of an instrument and that the payee's failure to qualify as a
holder required summary judgment in favor of the banks.98 As further
support for its decision, the court noted that the revised Code now pro-
vides expressly that a conversion action may not be maintained by a
payee who does not receive delivery of an instrument and that this
amendment resolves any confusion about this issue that may have existed
prior to the amendment. 99
In Basse Truck Line, Inc. v. First State Bank,1°° an employee began
defrauding his employer by presenting a series of fraudulent premium
invoices in the name of the employer's insurance carrier, "Texas Insur-
ance Agency, Inc." He then indorsed the checks issued to pay these in-
voices in the name "Texas Insurance," which was similar to, but not
identical with, the name of the payee appearing on the check, and depos-
ited the checks in a bank account he had opened in the name "Texas
Insurance." After the scheme was discovered, the employer, as drawer of
the checks, sued the various banks that had handled the checks in the
process of collection and payment. The employer argued that the "im-
postor rule" under the prior version of the Code required an indorsement
identical to the name of the payee appearing on a check. 10 1 Since the
94. See id.
95. See id. at 622.
96. 931 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, no writ).
97. See id. at 660.
98. See id. at 661. In reaching this conclusion the court relied heavily on the case of
Rex Smith Propane, Inc. v. National Bank of Commerce, 372 F. Supp. 499 (N.D. Tex.
1974). It should be noted that this is only a lower federal court decision interpreting Texas
law in the absence of controlling Texas precedent. Miller-Rogaska was, therefore, only one
step removed from the "no precedent" situation presented in Texas Stadium described in
the text accompanying notes 92-96.
99. See Miller-Rogaska, 931 S.W.2d at 661-62.
100. 949 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, writ denied).
101. The impostor rule appeared in the former Chapter 3 as TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 3.405(a)(3) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994). As revised, it now appears as TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 3.404(b), (c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1998). See Act of May 28,
1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 921, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 4597, 4616.
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indorsements in question here did not exactly match the name of the
payee on the checks, the employer contended the banks should be liable
for wrongfully paying the amount of the checks to the faithless employee.
The court disagreed, noting that the revised Code rejects the requirement
of an exactly matching indorsement and disapproves earlier decisions to
the contrary.' 0 2 In a frank recognition of the impact the revised Code has
on this issue, the court declined to adopt a reading of the prior Code that
"would be immediately obsolete, considering the legislature's action.' 03
The court ruled that the substantial similarity of the indorsements was
enough to put the loss resulting from the employee's fraud on the em-
ployer rather than on the banks.1 04
B. LOST, DESTROYED, OR STOLEN INSTRUMENTS
In Geiselman v. Cramer Financial Group, Inc.,105 the issue was whether
the purported owner of two promissory notes was required to prove that
it had possession of the notes prior to their loss or destruction. Relying
on, and quoting from the opinion in Western National Bank v. Rives, 106
discussed in last year's Survey, 0 7 the court held that the old Code should
be interpreted in a manner consistent with the requirement of the revised
Code that an owner of a lost instrument must show prior possession of
the instrument to recover on it after its loss or destruction. 108
C. DEPOSIT CONTRACTS AND CORPORATE RESOLUTIONS
The authority of an agent to sign instruments can arise either in situa-
tions involving the agent's authority to sign checks for the principal as the
drawer or to indorse checks for the principal as the payee or other holder.
In many cases a bank will require the principal, who is frequently a cor-
poration, to provide a corporate resolution identifying the person or per-
sons who are entitled to sign or indorse checks. While such a resolution is
generally a good idea for a bank, it can occasionally backfire, as illus-
trated by Humble National Bank v. DCV, Inc.109
102. See Basse Truck, 949 S.W.2d at 20.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 21. The court also rejected the employer's contention that the payor
bank had violated the DTPA by shortening the time limits provided in TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 4.406 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 1998) in its depositor agreements.
In the absence of Texas case law on the issue, the court found that other jurisdictions had
approved such agreements and that it found the reasoning in these jurisdictions persuasive.
See 949 S.W.2d at 22.
105. No. 14-96-00265-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 28, 1997, n.w.h.) (not
designated for publication), 1997 WL 528630.
106. 927 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, writ denied).
107. See John Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, 50 SMU L. REv. 1038-39 (1997).
108. See Western National, 927 S.W.2d at 685. The old Code did not specify whether
prior possession was required. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.804 (Tex. UCC)(Vernon 1994). The revised Code now specifically requires that the owner have been in
possession of the instrument. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.309(a)(1) (Tex. UCC)(Vernon Supp. 1998); Act of May 28, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 921, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen.
Laws 4594, 4625.
109. 933 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
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In Humble the court addressed two principal issues. First, whether a
bank breached an express warranty to its customer under the DTPA
based on advertising that the bank had "A Tradition of Excellence" and a
policy of "knowing its customers."' 10 Second, whether a corporate reso-
lution protected a bank from liability for issuing cashiers' checks to a cor-
porate representative when the terms of the resolution authorize a
different person to "endorse and cash checks.""'
On the issue of breach of express warranty, the court carefully ana-
lyzed prior law under the DTPA on what constitutes an express warranty
and concluded that the slogan "A Tradition of Excellence" and the adver-
tisement of "knowing its customers" was mere opinion or puffing insuffi-
cient to create an express warranty. 1 2 On the issue of authority granted
by the corporate resolution, the bank argued that the representative had
apparent authority to obtain cashiers' checks, but the court held that a
cashier's check is the functional equivalent of cash and, therefore, issuing
cashiers' checks to someone other than the person specified in the resolu-
tion was tantamount to cashing the corporate checks. Because the bank,
at its own request, had obtained the corporate resolution and had it in
hand when the cashiers' checks were issued, it could not claim apparent
authority of the agent as a means of avoiding liability to its corporate
customer. 13
D. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
During the 1997 legislative session, Texas added a non-uniform provi-
sion to section 3.118 providing that the six-year limitations period for
notes stated in section 3.118 does not apply to actions involving a real
property lien covered by the four year limitations period in the Civil
Practice and Remedies Code for the enforcement of real property
liens.1 4 This amendment eliminates the uncertainty that existed previ-
ously in regard to the relationship between the limitations periods in sec-
tion 3.118 and the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. This earlier
uncertainty about the limitations periods is discussed in the State Bar
Committee Comment to section 3.118 in the Business & Commerce
Code. 115
Another non-uniform amendment added during the 1997 legislative
session was the addition of a new warranty to Chapters 3 and 4 of the
Code to deal with situations in which a third-party draws a draft against a
110. See id. at 229.
111. See id. at 236.
112. See id. at 231.
113. See id. at 238.
114. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.118(h) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
The four year limitations period in the Civil Practice and Remedies Code are contained in
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.035, 16.036 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1998).
115. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.118 cmt. (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
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customer's account. 116 Such third-party drafts may be used to make rou-
tine, recurring payments on obligations of the customer, such as the
monthly payment of insurance premiums, or they may be used in single
payment situations, such as payments for merchandise ordered by tele-
phone or by computer. The new warranty provides that any person or
collecting bank presenting a third-party draft for payment, or any prior
transferor, warrants that the draft has been authorized by the customer.
The purpose of this warranty is to protect subsequent holders and payors
who take or pay such a draft when it has not been authorized by the
customer by providing a right of recourse against the presenter or any
prior parties. Because of the non-uniform nature of this amendment, a
special conflict of laws rule was also added providing that the warranty
will have limited effect if the law of the transferor's jurisdiction does not
provide for a similar warranty.117 Provisions were also added to the defi-
nitions of negotiable instruments in section 3.104 to designate such third-
party drafts as "demand drafts." 118
V. FUNDS TRANSFERS
A. NAME AND NUMBER INCONSISTENCIES (BENEFICIARY)
In G4 Trading, Inc. v. NationsBank of Texas,119 the court held that a
typed set of instructions containing an incorrect account number given to
a bank employee by the president of the originating company was suffi-
cient to show that permission was given to the bank to act on those in-
structions and was also sufficient to support jury findings against the
originator. 20 The court concluded that the written instructions provided
by the president on behalf of the company constituted written authoriza-
tion and manifested the company's intention to have the bank act upon
the instructions.' 21 Testimony showed that the president knew of the
bank's policy that they would make the transfer if written authorization
was given and that he did leave the instructions with the bank. 122 Testi-
mony also showed that it was common for customers to bring in their
written instructions and for the bank to follow such instructions in execut-
ing a wire transfer. 23
116. The new warranty provisions appear in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§§ 3.416(a)(6), 3.417(a)(4), 4.207(a)(6), 4.208(a)(4) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
Although appearing in several different subsections, the substance of the warranty is the
same.
117. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.416(e), 3.417(g), 4.207(e), 4.208(g) (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
118. See TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 3.104(k) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
119. 937 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).
120. See id. at 141.
121. See id.




VI. BILLS OF LADING AND WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS
A. LIABILITY FOR MISDELIVERY
In Soto v. Sea-Road International, Inc.,12 4 a transportation company,
acting on the seller's instructions, delivered goods to the buyer's customs
agent under a delivery order that required the customs agent to check
with the transportation company before any of the goods were released.
The customs agent subsequently released the goods to a third party with-
out first contacting the transportation company and the goods disap-
peared without any payment having been made to either the seller or to
the transportation company.
In an action for conversion by the transportation company against the
customs agent, the agent argued that he was not a bailee of the goods
because a delivery order reserves no security interest in the goods under
section 2.505 of the Code.125 While the court agreed that this was a cor-
rect reading of that section, it also pointed out that, under section 7.102,
once a delivery order has been accepted by the bailee, it is equivalent to a
document of title.126 Since the customs agent had accepted the delivery
order, he became a warehouseman with respect to the goods and was
bound to follow the instructions contained in the delivery order. Under
these circumstances, the customs agent was liable in conversion for the
value of the goods that had been improperly released. 2 7
VII. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
A. CREATION OF SECURITY INTEREST
Under section 9.203 of the Code, a secured party must give value to
create an effective security interest. In In re IPS Systems, Inc. 128 the court
held that a law firm had given value sufficient to create a security interest
in the retainer paid to the firm by a debtor whom the firm agreed to
represent prior to the filing of the debtor's bankruptcy. The court held
that, while the security interest and payments from the retainer were sub-
ject to later review by the bankruptcy court, it met the requirements of
section 9.203 for the creation of a valid prepetition security interest.' 29
If a seller or lender advances funds to a debtor to permit the debtor to
acquire property to be used as collateral for the advance, a security inter-
est in that collateral is termed a "purchase money security interest" and
carries with it some special advantages under various provisions of Chap-
ter 9. Even though a security interest may start out as a purchase money
security interest, it may not remain a purchase money security interest if
124. 942 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, writ denied).
125. See id. at 73 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE AN. § 2.505(a)(2) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1994)).
126. See id. at 74 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 7.102 cmt. 3 (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1991)).
127. See id.
128. 205 B.R. 88 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1997).
129. See id. at 89.
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the debtor refinances the obligation. Under the "transformation rule,"
the refinancing of an obligation causes a purchase money security interest
to lose its special character and it becomes an ordinary security interest.
Outside bankruptcy, there is a split of authority on whether the transfor-
mation rule applies to a purchase money security interest.130 In bank-
ruptcy, however, the transformation rule is routinely applied as the
secured party learned to its dismay in In re Gonzales,'3' where the debtor
signed a new note and security agreement to refinance an existing debt
incurred for the purchase of furniture and to borrow additional funds
from the creditor. The prior documents were marked "paid" when the
debt was refinanced. Noting that the Fifth Circuit has adopted the "trans-
formation rule," the court held that the security interest lost its purchase
money status and could be avoided under section 522 of the Bankruptcy
Code as a nonpossessory nonpurchase money lien.132
In In re White133 the secured party argued that, because it had repos-
sessed the collateral prior to the debtor's bankruptcy, it had acquired a
possessory security interest that could not be avoided by the debtor.
Although the court recognized that there is a split of authority on this
issue, it believed the better reasoned view was to determine if the parties
intended the security interest to be a possessory interest. 34 Applying this
test, the court held that, since the bank had acquired possession of the
collateral by foreclosure instead of by the debtor's consent, the security
interest was still a nonpossessory lien as contemplated by the policy of the
Bankruptcy Code. a35
B. PERFECTION AND CONTINUATION OF SECURITY INTERESTS
Besides creating an effective security interest, a secured party must be
sure the interest is properly perfected. In In re Gulf Forge Co.,13 6 a fi-
nancing statement describing collateral as "goods, including without limi-
tation, inventory and furniture" was held to be sufficient to put a
competing creditor on notice of a bank's security interest in the debtor's
equipment. 37 In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that more
specificity is required in a security agreement than in a financing state-
130. See Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Tascosa Nat'l Bank, 784 S.W.2d 129 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1990, writ denied) (discussing the "transformation rule" and the compet-
ing "dual status rule").
131. 206 B.R. 133 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997).
132. See id. at 136.
133. 203 B.R. 613 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996). The Fifth Circuit adopted the transforma-
tion rule in Roberts Furniture Co. v. Pierce, 507 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975). Section 522 of
the Bankruptcy Code permits debtors to avoid certain nonpossessory nonpurchase money
liens on collateral if they impair an exemption to which the debtor would otherwise be
entitled. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1998).
134. See 203 B.R. at 616.
135. See id. In this regard the court noted, "To hold otherwise would subvert Congress'
expressed intent that the debtors be entitled to their exemptions, even though the creditor
should beat them in the race to the courthouse." Id. at 617.
136. 202 B.R. 238 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1996).
137. Id. at 241.
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ment and that the language describing a security interest in "goods" in
the financing statement was enough to put a searcher on inquiry notice as
to what goods were covered. 138
Even if a security interest is properly perfected, a secured party must
take steps to continue that perfection if a financing statement is nearing
the end of its statutory five year life.139 Under Chapter 9 a continuation
statement may be filed to renew the filing for an additional five years.
140
Under a non-uniform Texas amendment to section 9.401, a continuation
statement filed to continue perfection in farm equipment that was origi-
nally perfected before September 1, 1985 "must contain the information
contained in the original financing statement. ' 141 In In re McCloy,142 the
failure of the secured party to include any description of the collateral in
a continuation statement rendered the security interest unperfected. The
court noted that, although the formal requisites for continuation state-
ments are minimal, both Texas and Fifth Circuit authority requires that
they be followed.143
Even if a security interest is properly created and perfected, it may
simply evaporate if the collateral vanishes. This happened to a bank in In
re Pitcock,144 where a security interest in crops was literally "eaten up"
when the debtor rented out the land where the crops were growing as
pasture land in exchange for pasture rents. By the time bankruptcy was
filed, the cattle had eaten the crops and the debtor had spent the rental
income on living expenses. Since there was no longer any collateral to
secure the bank's claim, the court ruled that the bank had become a mere
unsecured creditor. 145
The advantage gained by a secured party who properly creates, per-
fects, and continues a security interest in collateral is nicely illustrated by
the decision in Conoco, Inc. v. Amarillo National Bank,146 where a bank
held a perfected security interest in the inventory and accounts receivable
of a petroleum distributor. The distributor entered into a jobber's con-
tract with Conoco to sell gasoline through the distributor's retail outlets.
The contract allowed Conoco to setoff amounts owed to Conoco by the
distributor against the credit card sales generated through the retail out-
lets. If sales were not sufficient to cover the amounts owed, Conoco
would draft the distributor's account at the bank for the difference. The
debtor eventually defaulted on its bank loans and the bank refused to pay
138. See id. at 243.
139. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.403(f) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991) (provid-
ing that a financing statement is effective for a period of five years from the date of filing).
140. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.403(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
141. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.401(f) (Vernon 1991).
142. 206 B.R. 428 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997).
143. See id. at 434.
144. 208 B.R. 862 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997).
145. See id. at 866. Because there was no longer any collateral to secure the bank's
claim, the court found it unnecessary to address the question of whether the description of
collateral in the bank's security agreement was sufficiently broad to include pasture rents.
146. 950 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, pet. filed).
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several drafts drawn by Conoco against the distributor's account. Conoco
then began requiring the distributor to pay cash for its gasoline
purchases, but continued to setoff against the credit card sales. The bank
sued Conoco for conversion of its collateral alleging that it had a valid
and perfected security interest in the distributor's accounts receivable. 147
The court held that the bank's security interest was superior to Conoco's
unsecured right of setoff.148 The court further held that the two year limi-
tations period applicable to actions for conversion did not bar the bank's
claim because the action was brought within two years after the bank
discovered that the conversion had occurred. 149 Although the bank pre-
vailed on these issues, the court ruled that the bank had failed to show, as
a matter of law, that it had neither consented to the setoffs nor waived its
claim to the collateral by permitting the distributor to continue in busi-
ness following default. 50 The case was remanded for trial on the issues of
consent and waiver.' 5 '
C. DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL AFTER DEFAULT
In Friedman v. Atlantic Funding Corp. ,152 the court overturned a sum-
mary judgment entered in favor of a secured creditor because the creditor
failed to plead or prove that it had met the pleading and proof require-
ments established by Greathouse v. Charter National Bank-Southwest 53
for the recovery of a deficiency judgment following the repossession and
disposition of collateral.
Although not directly involving the risk of improper disposition of col-
lateral under Chapter 9, Ellis County State Bank v. Keever,154 illustrates
how attempts to collect a secured debt can get out of hand. In Keever, the
secured party was unable to collect on a $6,000 debt secured by office
equipment and furniture. Frustrated by this turn of events, the creditor
took the case to the district attorney and a grand jury indicted the debtor
for hindering a secured creditor. The criminal district court eventually
quashed the indictment and the district attorney declined to seek rei-
ndictment. The debtor then sued the secured party along with some other
147. See id. at 793.
148. See id. at 796.
149. See id. at 798. On this point the opinion contains a good discussion of the applica-
tion of the discovery rule to conversion actions and the duty of the aggrieved party to use
due diligence to discover that a conversion has taken place. See id. at 797-99.
150. See 950 S.W.2d at 795.
151. See id. at 800.
152. 936 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ).
153. 851 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. 1992). The requirements established by Greathouse can be
summarized as follows: (1) the creditor in a deficiency suit has the burden of initially plead-
ing that a disposition of collateral was commercially reasonable; (2) this pleading may be
made either specifically or generally; (3) if the allegations are specific, the creditor auto-
matically assumes the burden of proving the allegations; and (4) if the pleading is general,
the creditor is required to prove the disposition was commercially reasonable only if the
debtor specifically denies such disposition in the answer.
154. 936 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, no writ).
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defendants for malicious prosecution and recovered a judgment that in-
cluded a $1,000,000 punitive damage award against the secured party.
In what appears to be the last in a series of appeals and remands,155 the
court of appeals ruled that the debtor had proven all of the elements
required for a malicious prosecution claim and, under the standards re-
quired by Transportation Insurance Co. v. Moriel,156 the punitive damage
award was not excessive. Judgment against the secured party was
affirmed.1 57
D. AMENDMENTS TO CHAPTER 9
Two non-uniform amendments were added to Chapter 9 during the
1997 legislative session. Perhaps the most important of these was the ad-
dition of a means by which a security interest can be taken and perfected
in a nonnegotiable certificate of deposit (sometimes called a "book-entry
CD"). Under this amendment, the definition of "instrument" in section
9.105 of the Code was expanded to include nonnegotiable certificates of
deposit evidenced by a written document stating that the document is a
certificate of deposit or a receipt for a book entry acknowledging that a
sum of money was received by the issuer and that the money will be re-
paid by the issuer.' 58 Conforming changes were also made to include
such documents within the definition of "instrument" instead of within
the definition of "deposit account.' 59 These definitional changes were
intended to distinguish nonnegotiable certificates of deposit from ordi-
nary deposit accounts normally excluded from Chapter 9 by section
9.104.160
The substantive portion of this amendment appears in section 9.304
which was revised to permit the issuer of a nonnegotiable certificate of
deposit to obtain a possessory security interest in the certificate by plac-
ing a restriction on withdrawals from the account.' 61 By redefining "in-
strument" to include a book entry receipt showing issuance of a
certificate of deposit, a secured party who is not the issuer can take a
security interest in the deposit by taking possession of the document or
receipt showing establishment of the certificate of deposit account. To
gain priority, however, the secured party must give notice of the security
155. The case has had a lengthy appellate history. See Ellis County State Bank v.
Keever, 870 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992), affd in part, rev'd in part, 888 S.W.2d 790
(Tex. 1994); 913 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 915 S.W.2d
478 (Tex. 1995).
156. 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994).
157. See 936 S.W.2d at 690.
158. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.105(a)(14) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp.
1998).
159. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.105(a)(5) & (a)(9) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
Supp. 1998).
160. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.104(12) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994) (provid-
ing that Chapter 9 does not apply to the transfer of an interest in a deposit account except
with respect to proceeds and priorities in proceeds).
161. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.304(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
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interest to the issuer before the issuer creates a security interest in the
same account.
The second amendment to Chapter 9 was intended to protect purchas-
ers of accounts and chattel paper to make it clear that the filing provi-
sions of Chapter 9 may be used to document an outright sale that is not
intended by the parties to be a secured transaction.162
162. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.102(a)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
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